I was elated to hear that some adult supervisors have temporarily put a halt to the transfer of the Air Force’s IT department to the so called Cyber Command. Don’t you agree that the whole concept seemed dreamed up by some kids playing in a sandbox?
“Hey my lasers can shoot your tanks!”
“Well, I am moving 10,000 of my troops into my Cyber Command and they are going to attack your infrastructure!”
The posturing around the Air Force Cyber Command was almost incomprehensible to non-military types like me. How was the Air Force going to employ 10,000 people in the defense of Cyber space? One researcher even proposed using US military networks to retaliate against DDoS attacks. Huh? There is a name for that: suicide.
As an example of their posturing read their"Vision Statement" from the website:
"To secure our nation by employing world-class cyberspace capabilities to control cyberspace, create integrated global effects, and deliver sovereign options."
What does “integrated global effects” mean? Did the ghost of Al Haig write their vision statement? The web site posted this announcement today:
The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have considered delaying currently planned actions on Air Force Cyber Command to allow ample time for a comprehensive assessment of all AFCYBER requirements and to synchronize the AFCYBER mission with other key Air Force initiatives.
Three cheers for reason. Let’s hope the new Air Force leadership discovers that there is a lot of house cleaning to do within the Air Force to make it secure from attacks and spy incursions before they start playing with questionable offensive measures.
About Stiennon
Richard Stiennon is a security industry analyst. He is currently consulting, speaking and writing on all manner of security topics for IT-Harvest, the IT research firm he founded to cover the security space. He was most recently chief marketing officer for Fortinet. He has served stints at PricewaterhouseCoopers, Gartner, and Webroot Software.
The opinions expressed in this Weblog are those of the writer and may not represent the opinions of Network World.
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Complete collapse of this pipedream
I blogged about this too a few weeks ago when the Air Force fired their chief, Michael Wynn. He was fired mostly for losing count of the number of nukes he was supposed to be watching. But I suspect he was getting a little megalomaniacal about his cyber command as well.
http://www.belch.com/blog/2008/06/05/michael-wynn-fired-what-about-air-force-cyber-command/
I do have a background working with DoD, and was always puzzled why the Airforce was trying to duplicate work performed by DISA and US-CERT.
I hope they don't cancel all
I hope they don't cancel all the changes. Air Force IT is running as well as France's Maginot line did in WWII. The fortress mentality in current IT leadership won't protect us.
Cyber Command
I suggest you leave your comments to yourself when you are discussing something from such an infantile, naive, and ignorant stance. Study some military doctrine and then make another attempt.
You talking to me?
Regardless of wether or not you addressed me in this rude, cowardly manner I would suggest that no thinking person has the stomach to "study military doctrine". This is 2008. Doctrines are only of interest to those who write them and those who follow them. The rest of us will study military history and apply what we learn.
-Stiennon
AF CYBER Command needs to happen
I think the original message here is way off the mark. I've seen first hand how jacked up the military networks can be, how much data is being exfiltrated, and the classified intel involved. There are other agencies that try to do similar work, but they don't actually try to actively defend the military networks, they simply notify agencies of stuff they find, and trust me, they are missing %99 of intrusions. And I've been on a DISA assessment... not very useful. W/o a unifying effort, our military networks will continue to be porous and have their sensitive but unclassified data exfiltrated at an amazing rate.
Off the mark?
So somehow, putting all cyber under one command who has failed to defend its own territory fixes things? That would be like putting the responsibility for the financial bailout in the hands of one organization. Oh...wait...
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