The recurring topic of RFID security flaws has been making headlines again lately. But unlike new e-mail viruses or Internet worms that demand the immediate attention of the IT department, this threat isn’t a front-burner security issue…at least not yet.

A few recent events have brought renewed attention to the fact that RFID is vulnerable. Earlier this month a security expert cracked one of the U.K.’s new biometric passports that use RFID to store personal information. Last month at the RSA Security `07 conference, a company called IOActive demonstrated an RFID cloner that can steal codes from building access cards. (IOActive was slated to show a similar demonstration at last month’s Black Hat security conference, but the session was quashed by a leading RFID card maker and generated more headlines regarding fairness and disclosure than the original demo would have.)

Add those events to headlines from the past year that the U.S. Department of State plans to issue passports with RFID chips containing personal information -- to which the American Civil Liberties Union has expressed vehement opposition because of the potential for exposed personal information – and reports that an RFID virus could be developed that make tags vulnerable, and suddenly the technology seems about as safe as sending confidential data over Web mail.

Yet, unlike Internet threats that could affect every person using the Web, RFID security holes are only truly dangerous if the information stored on these tags is valuable. In most enterprise applications of RFID today – many of which are still in their early phases – that’s not the case.

Nutritional product maker Schiff Nutrition launched an RFID pilot about three months ago to tag cases and palates of supplements and energy bars with basic information – what the product is, where it was manufactured, and what kind of item it is. Security has not yet factored into the project, says Rod Farrimond, manager of business analysis, because that data alone isn’t valuable.