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In this chapter, we will discuss several areas of IPsec virtual private network (VPN) design that commonly present obstacles to successful deployment. We will begin our discussion with a brief overview of the diagnostic tools available within IOS commonly used to diagnose and correct issues with IPsec VPN deployments. After presenting the tools needed to troubleshoot IPsec, we will begin to explore two broad categories of common IPsec VPN issues: configuration and architecture. The IPsec VPN configuration issues we will explore in this chapter include:
IKE SA Proposal Mismatches
IKE Authentication Failures
IPsec SA Proposal Mismatches
Crypto ACL Mismatches
Unlike configuration issues, architectural issues do not require a misconfiguration by the administrator. Architectural issues are often introduced by incompatibilities between IPsec and other networking technologies. The architectural IPsec VPN issues we will discuss in this chapter include:
IPsec in Firewalled Environments
IPsec in NAT Environments
IPsec and Quality of Service
IPsec and Fragmentation
IPsec and Recursive Routing
The most commonly used categories of diagnostic tools used within Cisco IOS are show and debug commands. Throughout the course of this chapter, we will use variations of these two command sets to diagnose issues commonly found within Cisco IOS. As we've discussed, there are detailed steps that occur during the formation of Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) and IPsec negotiation between two IPsec VPN endpoints. We will examine common errors in these steps through execution of the following debugging commands within IOS:
debug crypto isakmp
debug crypto IPsec
Additionally, we will explore several show commands necessary to uncover common errors and performance issues related to the negotiate of IPsec VPN tunnels, including fragmentation/maximum transmission unit (MTU) issues, quality of service (QoS) issues, Network Address Translation (NAT) issues, and issues relating to recursive routing. A subset of the commands we will discuss to address these issues includes:
show crypto isakmp sa
show crypto isakmp sa nat
show crypto IPsec sa
show crypto engine connections active
show crypto engine connections dropped-packet
show crypto engine connections flow
show crypto engine qos
There are many parameters and features to understand when deploying IPsec VPNs. In this section, we will discuss configuration issues presented when one or more IPsec VPN gateways are configured incorrectly. After discussing the nature of each of the above commonly experienced IPsec VPN configuration issues, we will discuss the methods used to effectively diagnose and remedy these issues.
Unless IPsec session keys are manually defined, two crypto endpoints must agree upon an ISAKMP policy to use when negotiating the secure Internet Key Exchange (IKE) channel, or ISAKMP security association (SA). As such, when two VPN endpoints fail to agree upon a usable ISAKMP policy, IPsec SA negotiation cannot initiate, and traffic will continue to flow unencrypted.
Figure 2-24 and Figure 2-25 provide a brief description of ISAKMP policy negotiation process in main mode and aggressive mode respectively and the involved configuration on two VPN endpoints. Also remember from our discussions in Chapter 2 that ISAKMP policies are listed in order of priority (the lower number being the highest priority). The initiator will offer the highest priority proposal, and the responder will search its locally configured ISAKMP policies for a match. If there are none, the initiator will propose the next highest ISAKMP policy and define its local configuration. This process will continue until the initiator has no proposals left to offer the responder. The result, in this case, would be an ISAKMP SA proposal mismatch. Using the configurations provided in Example 4-1 and Example 4-2, Router_A and Router_B will attempt to form an IKE SA between one another using the topology illustrated in Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1
ISAKMP SA Negotiation Resulting in ISAKMP Proposal Mismatch
Example 4-1 provides the ISAKMP policies configured for Router_A in Figure 4-1. Note that, in this configuration, there are no ISAKMP proposals configured that match those configured on Router_B in Example 4-2.
Router_A#show crypto isakmp policy
Global IKE policy
Protection suite of priority 10
encryption algorithm: Three key triple DES
hash algorithm: Message Digest 5
authentication method: Pre-Shared Key
Diffie-Hellman group: #2 (1024 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Protection suite of priority 20
encryption algorithm: DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys).
hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard
authentication method: Pre-Shared Key
Diffie-Hellman group: #2 (1024 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Protection suite of priority 30
encryption algorithm: AES - Advanced Encryption Standard (128 bit keys).
hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard
authentication method: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature
Diffie-Hellman group: #1 (768 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Default protection suite
encryption algorithm: DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys).
hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard
authentication method: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature
Diffie-Hellman group: #1 (768 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Example 4-2 provides the ISAKMP policy configuration on Router_B of Figure 4-1. Router_B will use this policy when building an ISAKMP SA to Router_A, whose ISAKMP policy is provided in Example 4-1. Because Router_B's ISAKMP configuration contains no matching proposals with Router_A's configuration provided in Example 4-1, ISAKMP negotiation will fail.
Router_B#show crypto isakmp policy
Global IKE policy
Protection suite of priority 10
encryption algorithm: AES - Advanced Encryption Standard (128 bit keys).
hash algorithm: Message Digest 5
authentication method: Pre-Shared Key
Diffie-Hellman group: #5 (1536 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Protection suite of priority 20
encryption algorithm: Three key triple DES
hash algorithm: Message Digest 5
authentication method: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature
Diffie-Hellman group: #1 (768 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Protection suite of priority 30
encryption algorithm: DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys).
hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard
authentication method: Pre-Shared Key
Diffie-Hellman group: #2 (1024 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Default protection suite
encryption algorithm: DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys).
hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard
authentication method: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature
Diffie-Hellman group: #1 (768 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
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